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 The Romantic era represented a considerable artistic and 
philosophical paradigm shift towards subjectivity in perceiving and 
portraying the world around us, and thus heavily relied on the fusion of 
several distinct topics: religion, politics, social matters, nature, art, etc. In the 
context of British Romanticism, or more precisely British Romantic poetry, 
one might point out the importance of the “great six” poets: William Blake, 
William Wordsworth, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Lord Byron, Percy Bysshe 
Shelley, and John Keats. This paper comparatively takes into consideration 
Blake and Shelley, and singles out two of their poems which are generally 
considered to represent some of their finest work – Blake’s “The Tyger” and 
Shelley’s “Mont Blanc”. The comparison of the poems yields, in spite of their 
rarely being considered as companion pieces, great philosophical and 
poetic resemblances. Both authors saw nature, albeit in unique ways, as a 
logical extension of the poet’s imagination and of religious considerations, 
which becomes evident upon reading the poems. The similitudes 
demonstrated here serve as evidence of the complex entanglement of 
Romantic ideologies, both on the level of a single author or a single poem 
and on the level of time and place (turn-of-the-nineteenth-century England). 
Furthermore, the paper situates the said poems in a broader European 
political context and delineates the possible influence of that context on 
their creation.
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PETRA CHARVÁTOVÁ
Does Number Agree?  Structure of Number 
of NPL Phrases with Respect to Agreement
 Twenty-two years and a whole generation of development in 
Romantic thought passed between the publication dates of William 
Blake’s poem “The Tyger” (published as a part of his 1794 collection Songs 
of Experience) and Percy Bysshe Shelley’s 1816 “Mont Blanc,” yet they share 
what Bloom calls a “pattern of natural inspiration as a reciprocal process 
or dialogue between phenomena and the poet’s imaginings” (296). Thus, 
both the eponymous tiger for Blake and the sublime Swiss mountain for 
Shelley are creations which, in conjunction with the poet’s imagination, 
serve as a source of conception of revolutionary, or at least social, activity. 
Naturally, Blake and Shelley viewed England and Europe from two 
different contexts (pre-Napoleonic and post-Napoleonic, respectively), 
but the primary focus of the poems is generally the same: what is the 
origin of those creations, and what is their awe-inspiring power saying? 
At that point, further similarities between the poems, and consequently 
between their authors, emerge – on the level of religious convictions, for 
Shelley was a “religious poet whose passionate convictions are agnostic” 
(Bloom 282) and Blake was a “believer in the divine reality,” but not “a theist 
in any orthodox sense” (Bloom 5). Therefore, both looked with disfavour 
upon religious dogma and orthodox Christianity. Still, a sense of spirituality 
pervades over their imaginative ponderings in the two poems, in which 
the triangle of religion, imagination, and urbanity is, as this paper hopes to 
demonstrate, the centre of poetic sensibility. It is also what propelled them 
both to value “poetry over all other human speech,” since for them poetry 
is the only artistic form through which one can express that sensibility 
(Bloom 6), and without it, the tiger’s and the mountain’s metaphysical 
aspects would have remained largely useless. Blake opens “The Tyger” 
with the following, now iconic lines:
Tyger Tyger, burning bright, 
In the forests of the night; 
What immortal hand or eye, 
Could frame thy fearful symmetry? (1–4)
 Immediately, the problem of the poem is two-fold: in Brennan’s 
words, the poet both questions the “wonder [of] the tiger’s existence and 
the tremendous power that must have been necessary to bring it about” 
(406). The “immortal hand or eye” (emphasis mine) signifies that the creator 
of the tiger must be of nature above that of humans – God, or at least a god. 
However, the tiger’s “symmetry” is “fearful” – it is a creature of immense, 
terrible power, and therefore, the question arises: “if this creature be so 
frightful, so powerful, what must he be who ‘framed’ that fearful might 
and brought it into being?” (Brennan 406). The portentousness of that 
power continues to reappear throughout the later stanzas, in the shape 
of a “fire in [its] eyes” (6), “sinews of [its] heart” (10), its “dread grasp” (15), 
“deadly terrors clasp” (16), etc. However, as the poem progresses with its 
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rhythmic series of rhetorical questions, an alternative presents itself. It is, 
as Miner points out, a “Miltonic beast,” but its “fearful symmetry” is framed 
by “Divine as well as Satanic forces” (emphasis mine), for “in the first line 
of the second stanza . . . Blake speaks of the ‘distant deeps [of hell] or [of 
heaven]’” (484).1 The contrariness of such lines from the start alludes to 
the possibility that the fierceness of the tiger’s power (“burning bright”) 
might not only be of diabolical, but of divine, glorious, positive origin as 
well. The dubious duality of the creator is further made explicit by the 
end of stanza five: “Did he smile his work to see? / Did he who made the 
Lamb make thee?” (19–20). What is more, the context in which Blake wrote 
the poem must be remembered: in 1794, the violent effects of the French 
Revolution, generally referred to as the Reign of Terror, were beginning to 
make their mark on contemporary English and European society. It must 
have aroused complex feelings in him and made him “strengthen the 
myth or self-made account of reality given by his own poetry” (Bloom 2). 
Could it be possible, Blake asks, that if the great sinister power of the tiger 
has a benevolent side to it as well, it can be used for the improvement of 
society, for a noble cause. Can it, in Shelley’s words, “repeal large codes 
of fraud and woe” (“Mont Blanc” 80–81)? The tiger’s power may also very 
well have outgrown the original creator’s intentions, and a key reversal of 
roles is intimated in the last, otherwise repeated stanza, where God must 
dare to create such a power:
Tyger Tyger burning bright, 
In the forests of the night: 
What immortal hand or eye, 
Dare frame thy fearful symmetry? (21–24)
The shift from “could” to “dare” in the poem’s last line, thus, signifies a 
convergence of “all the terrifying implications of the questions posed with 
mounting intensity and deepening significance in the foregoing stanzas” 
(Brennan 406-407). The attempt at an answer is of course a juncture of 
contraries, and “the questioner who speaks the poem becomes more and 
more sure of the answer, and concurrently further and further away from 
the true answer” (Bloom 35).
 Are the tiger and its power, then, a socially useful or a detrimental 
entity? Is the tiger a symbol of “God’s Mercy” or “His Wrath” (Bloom 38)? 
Upon answering that question, the third part of the aforementioned 
religion–imagination–revolution triangle comes into play – imagination. 
The key point of the poem is that “The forest,” as Bloom says, “is not ‘in the 
night’ but ‘of the night,’ and does not exist apart from it” (36). The beholder 
who sees the tiger’s burning energy is predestined to see it as powerful, 
malevolent, for he inherently sees it in the night. On the other hand, if, by 
the use of imagination, one chooses to see it in daylight, it is an altogether 
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different creature, and retrospectively, the opening exclamation “Tyger 
Tyger” engenders a tone of alluring mystery, rather than of awe: “Blake 
wants us to question the questioner, rather than to attempt an answer to a 
question that already seeks merely to answer itself” (Bloom 36). On a side 
note, such reading also puts into perspective Blake’s etchings of a meek, 
benevolent tiger on his original publication of the poem.
 Shelley’s poem differs from the outset from Blake’s in the mere 
fact that it is under the influence of, and describes the sublime immensity 
of, a real natural creation (the subtitle of the poem is Lines Written in the 
Vale of Chamouni), whereas Blake’s tiger is purely metaphorical – a divine 
vision. However, like beholding the “fearful” tiger in “The Tyger,” “’Mont 
Blanc’ makes one of Shelley’s strongest and most direct claims for the 
socio-political potential of the aesthetic response to nature” (Borushko 
225). At the end of the third stanza, Shelley writes:
Thou hast a voice, great Mountain, to repeal 
Large codes of fraud and woe; not understood 
By all, but which the wise, and great, and good 
Interpret, or make felt, or deeply feel (80-83).
The “voice” of the alpine sublime has the potential to bring about change 
by “repealing large codes of fraud and woe” – codes of a modern, industrial, 
overly pious society. Indeed, it is, in Borushko’s words, a “language of the 
phenomenal world” (246) which must be “felt” and “interpreted” by “the 
wise, and great, and good.” Thus, strong emphasis is put on the subjectivity 
of perceiving the sublime discourse, the “phenomenal” essence projected 
by the mountain, and accordingly, “the poem here registers the agency of 
the perceiving mind” (Borushko 246). For Shelley, the poets, the cultivated, 
by the use of their imaginative powers, are the ones who transform that 
discourse into politically potent poetry. (He would, of course, write that 
“poets are the unacknowledged legislators of the world” in A Defence 
of Poetry only five years later [1247].) Such imaginative powers are not 
only needed for “interpreting” the “voice” of the “great Mountain,” but 
also actively participate in its creation (not unlike the subjectivity of the 
perception of the tiger in Blake):
And what were thou, and earth, and stars, and sea, 
If to the human mind’s imaginings 
Silence and solitude were vacancy? (142-144)
Shelley’s philosophy of imagination as fuel for active involvement of the 
mind in perceiving and creating nature is closely akin to what Coleridge 
would call “Secondary Imagination” a year later in Biographia Literaria, and 
to Kant’s philosophy, which argues that imagination – an intuitive tool for 
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cognition of external reality – is one of the core faculties of the human mind 
(Kneller 2–6). What is at stake in such a process is “the proper intellectual 
and political response to the sublime” (Borushko 247). The Romantic poet is 
a genius, and only he is capable of deciphering nature’s transcendent voice.
 
 If the sublime is not just actively perceived by the mind in the form 
of creative and political impulses, but in turn also generated, the issue of 
the true creator of the mountain ensues. Borushko continues: “. . . in the 
experience of the sublime and its violence, the human mind might imagine 
a power, a known deity” (247). Shelley is aware of that and imbues the poem 
with a dose of scepticism himself, for “The wilderness has a mysterious 
tongue / Which teaches awful doubt or faith so mild” (76–77, emphasis 
mine). The “‘awful doubt’ is of any orthodox view of nature that sees it as the 
direct handiwork of a benevolent God” (Bloom 295). In contrast, “the ‘faith 
so mild’ is the solemn and serene natural piety of Wordsworth” (Bloom 295, 
emphasis mine). Hence, the poem demonstrates a complex rendition of 
theism, which quite jarringly compares to Shelley’s self-professed atheism. 
Shelley had earlier already asserted that “we invent [God’s] general name, 
to conceal our ignorance of causes and essences” (Necessity 5) and that “the 
educated man ceases to be superstitious” (Necessity 6). In “Mont Blanc,” he 
struggles with the possibility of the existence of a higher deity responsible 
for the creation of the sublime, which is probably, as Salt points out, of 
Pantheistic nature, and which marks a progression in Shelley’s thought 
from a “youthful mood of open denial and defiance” to the complexity of 
his “maturer years” (“Foreword” 1). If that deity exists, or if it is synonymous 
with nature itself, one “needs to recognize its potential malevolence. The 
mountain’s voice, if understood, tells us that the power of good or evil is in 
our own wills, for we can choose how to utilize natural power” (Bloom 295). 
What is needed for “the mountain’s voice” to be “understood” is precisely 
imagination, and then the mountain, like the tiger, diffuses political and 
revolutionary inspiration by its sheer intensity:
Fast clouds, shadows, and sunbeams; awful scene,
Where power in likeness of the Arve comes down,
From the ice-gulfs that gird his secret throne,
Bursting through these dark mountains like the flame
Of lightning through the tempest,—thou dost lie, 
The giant brood of pines around thee clinging (15-20).
 In conclusion, it is vital to remark that, when reading Blake’s “The 
Tyger” and Shelley’s “Mont Blanc,” religion, imagination, and revolution 
ought not to be viewed on their own, but as an inseparably cohesive matter 
of discussion. Each of them is elemental in understanding the other, and 
together they form a dialectic of “searching out the nature of the hidden 
power that governs thought and the universe” (Bloom 293). Both the tiger 
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and the mountain are mysterious entities standing before the eyes of the 
poet; in both cases, the poet questions its origin and that origin’s relation 
to his own imaginative capacity, and both entities unquestionably herald 
a politically potent lesson. Such intertwining reaffirms Bloom’s statement 
that “the outward form of the inward grace of Romantic imagination was 
the French Revolution, and the Revolution failed” (2). After the failure of 
first the Revolution, and then of Napoleon, both poets turned inwards and 
made social questions a matter of one’s imagination. Again, it should not 
be understated that Blake’s Tyger is imaginary and not in any sense real, 
yet it is still wholly comparable to Shelley’s mountain, since in both cases, 
the emphasis is on the origin and the functional end of the force, and all 
(imaginative) descriptions in the middle serve to point either backwards 
toward the former, or forwards toward the latter.
N. BRLEK, Religion, Imagination and Revolution in Blake's “The Tyger” and Shelley's “Mont Blanc” (40-47)
Patchwork Student Journal (2020), Issue No. 4, Zagreb
 46
END NOTES
1  This essay takes as a given the fact that “in Milton’s cosmography the 
upper part of the Universal Sphere relates to heaven, whereas the nadir of 
this sphere encompasses precincts of hell” (Miner 484).
N. BRLEK, Religion, Imagination and Revolution in Blake's “The Tyger” and Shelley's “Mont Blanc” (40-47)
Patchwork Student Journal (2020), Issue No. 4, Zagreb
 47
WORKS CITED
Blake, William. “The Tyger.” Romanticism: An Anthology, edited by Duncan 
Wu, 4th ed., Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 2012, pp. 203-204.
Bloom, Harold. The Visionary Company: A Reading of English Romantic 
Poetry. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1971.
Borushko, Matthew C. “The Politics of Subreption: Resisting the Sublime 
in Shelley’s “Mont Blanc”.” Studies in Romanticism, vol. 52, no. 2, 2013, pp. 
225-252.
Brennan, Joseph X. “The Symbolic Framework of Blake’s “The Tyger”.” 
College English, vol. 22, no. 6, 1961, pp. 406-407.
Kneller, Jane. Kant and the Power of Imagination. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007.
Miner, Paul. “Blake’s “Tyger” as Miltonic Beast.” Studies in Romanticism, vol. 
47, no. 4, 2008, pp. 479-505.
Salt, Henry S. “Foreword.” The Necessity of Atheism, by Percy Bysshe 
Shelley, Amherst: Prometheus Books, p. 1.
Shelley, Percy Bysshe. The Necessity of Atheism. Amherst: Prometheus 
Books, 1993.
---. “A Defence of Poetry.” Romanticism: An Anthology, edited by Duncan 
Wu, 4th ed., Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 2012, pp. 1233-1247.
---. “Mont Blanc.” Romanticism: An Anthology, edited by Duncan Wu, 4th ed., 
Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 2012, pp. 1104-1107.
Wu, Duncan, editor. Romanticism: An Anthology. 4th ed., Chichester: John 
Wiley & Sons, 2012.
N. BRLEK, Religion, Imagination and Revolution in Blake's “The Tyger” and Shelley's “Mont Blanc” (40-47)
Patchwork Student Journal (2020), Issue No. 4, Zagreb
